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THE DECLINE OF THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: HOW THE
RHETORIC OF SWIFT AND CERTAIN JUSTICE HAS
AFFECTED ADJUDICATION IN AMERICAN COURTS
ST_ 'm

LANDSMAN*

INTRODUCTION

For several hundred years American courts have utilized an
adversary process to adjudicate contested matters. At the heart of
this process is a trial in which the litigants present all the evidence
they believe to be relevant to the resolution of the dispute. When
the trial is concluded a neutral decision maker determines the outcome of the case on the basis of evidence presented. Although
elaborate sets of procedural, evidentiary, and ethical rules regulate
the behavior of the litigants, the parties retain extensive control
over the cases they bring.
In recent years, courts have reduced their reliance on adversary methods. A factor contributing to this result is the conviction
shared by a growing number of judges and legal scholars that the
adversary method causes delay1 and is unworkable in an era of
overcrowded dockets. Dean Roscoe Pound, in his celebrated 1906
address The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice,2 originated the rhetoric upon which much of the
modern assault on the adversary process has been based. In his
address Pound decried the absence of justice both "swift and cer* Associate Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. A.B. 1969, Kenyon College,
J.D. 1972, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge the financial assistance
of the Cleveland-Marshall Fund and the intellectual support and aid of a number of colleagues and friends including Richard Kuhns, Robert Bogomolny and Lewis Jordan as well
as the research assistance of James Deese and David Moser.
1. For the purposes of this Article no elaborate definition of delay is necessary. As
Professors Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz have stated "[e]veryone has a rough common sense
notion of what court delay means and everyone realizes that delay results from a backlog of
pending suits which forces the litigants to stand in line and wait their turn." H. ZEISEL, H.
KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 43 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DELAY IN
THE COURT]. It should be noted, however, that the measurement of delay is not a simple or
straightforward task. Id. at 43-57.
2. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice,
35 F.R.D. 273 (1964) (previously published in 40 AM. L. REv. 729 (1906)).
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tain" in the courts of his day and argued that delay was a major
cause of popular dissatisfaction with the judicial process.' He condemned a "sporting theory of justice" which rendered judges passive "umpires,' and he roundly criticized a number of adversary
mechanisms, including jury trials and strict appellate court enforcement of rules of procedure.5
Pound's remarks have served as a manifesto for those championing judicial efficiency and celerity." Their goal has been to secure the adoption of what they deem to be the speediest methods
of resolving disputes. In pursuit of this goal the architects of
change have ignored the aims and values of those aspects of the
adversary process they seek to alter. They have substituted the
rhetoric of swift and certain justice for a reasoned assessment of
the impact of change on the court system and society.
The adversary process has a number of indispensable components. These include a factfinder who is both neutral and passive,
parties who are responsible for the development of the evidence,
professional advocates who prepare and prosecute most lawsuits,
rules which tightly regulate the conduct of the participants, and
appellate courts which oversee the integrity of the process. In Part
I of this Article these components and their interrelationships are
considered. Part II carries this consideration a step further and
concludes that a process with the enumerated adversarial attributes is intrinsically and purposefully slow moving.
Part III details a number of situations in which adversary procedure has been either abandoned or altered because it is said to
cause delay or function inefficiently. On the basis of such arguments pressure has been applied to persuade the vast majority of
litigants to settle rather than pursue their claims. For similar reasons, decision maker neutrality and passivity have been substantially reduced through encouragement of judicial management of
litigation and curtailment of the use of twelve member juries. Alteration of various rules of procedure and evidence has also been
3. 35 F.R.D. at 291.
4. Id. at 281.
5. Id. passim.
6. See, e.g., Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79-246 (1976); Burger, The

Courts on Trial: A Call for Action Against Delay, 44 A.B.A.J. 738 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as A Call for Action]; Rosenberg, Let's Everybody Litigate?, 50 T x. L. REv. 1349 (1972).

1980]

DECLINING ADVERSARY SYSTEM

489

premised upon arguments concerning speed and efficiency. Finally,
the availability of appellate review has been curtailed in response
to claims that appeals cause unwarranted delay. Most of these
changes have been made without meaningful exploration of their
impact on the adversary process or the principles that it
vindicates.
Yielding to the call for swift and certain justice without carefully scrutinizing the implications of change has undermined a
number of procedures important to the adversary process. It has
also called into question the continuing viability of the process as a
whole. Every element of adversary procedure is designed to slow
the pace of litigation. Recognizing delay as a concern so significant
that it obviates the need to consider adversary values, suggests
that those values are of little lasting importance and that the process can be replaced. Part IV suggests that before change is made
the values served by the adversary process must be carefully
weighed.
Part V attempts to identify a number of the values served by
the adversary process and to fashion a defense of the process in
terms of those values. Central to this defense is the proposition
that adversary methods are particularly well suited to the protection of individual rights. In an era otherwise dominated by bureaucracy and actions designed to serve the common good, the vindication of individual rights is of extreme importance to society and
justifies the preservation of the adversary process.
The final part of this Article attempts to delineate circumstances in which the use of adversary methods may not be appropriate. This section concludes that, with certain exceptions, the
wisest approach to the problem is to allow litigants to choose the
type of process they think best suited to their particular needs.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF ADVERSARLL ADJUDICATION IN AMERICAN
COURTS

While there is frequent reference in legal literature to the notion that American courts utilize an adversarial method of adjudication, there has been little scholarly analysis of the nature and
implications of the adversary process. 7 Most commentary has fo7. Extended discussion of the adversary process is rare in recent American legal literature. The following sources are among the few which devote more than cursory attention to
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cused upon one or another technique and designated it the sine
qua non of adversary process. Cross-examination, party examination of witnesses, and judicial neutrality have each been described
in this way.' The adversary process, however, should not be viewed
as a single technique or collection of techniques; it is a unified concept that works by use of a number of interconnecting procedures,
each of real importance to the process as a whole. The central precept of adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of proofs
presented by adversaries in a forensic setting, is most likely to
come the information upon which a neutral and passive decision
maker can base the resolution of a litigated dispute acceptable to
both the parties and society.' This formulation is advantageous not
only because it expresses the overarching adversarial concept, but
also because it identifies the method to be utilized in adjudication
(the sharp clash of proofs), the actors essential to the process (two
adversaries and a decision maker),10 the nature of their functions
(presentation of proofs and adjudication of disputes respectively),
and the goal of the entire endeavor (the resolution of disputes in a
manner acceptable to the parties and society).
The adversary system utilizes a neutral decision maker who
the topic. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); W. GLASER, PRERIAL DISCOVERY AND THE
ADVERSARY SYsTEM (1968) [hereinafter cited as PRETRIAL DISCOVERY]; J. THIBAUT & L.
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JusTicm A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) [hereinafter cited as PnoCEDURAL JUSTmCE]; Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW (H. Berman
ed. 1971); Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Toward Public Justice]; Millar, The Formative Principles of
Civil Procedure-I, 18 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1923); Neef & Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the
American Legal System from a HistoricalPerspective, 20 N.Y.L.F. 123 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Historical Perspective]; Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the
American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REv. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Unnecessarily
Expanding Role].
8. See, e.g., J. FRANK, AmEmICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 127 (1969)
(cross-examination); Damaska, Presentationof Evidence and FactfindingPrecision, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1083, 1090-91 (1975) (party examination of witnesses); Goodhart, A Changing
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 VA. L. REv. 759, 764 (1965) (neutrality of the judge);
HistoricalPerspective,supra note 7, at 123-24 (confrontation of witnesses).
9. See B. BOTEIN & M. GORDON, THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE: CHALLENGE To THE LAW
78 (1963) [hereinafter cited as THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE]; PREmIAL DISCOVERY, supra note
7, at 13-14; PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 119; Adams, The Small Claims Court and
the Adversary: ProcessMore Problems of Function and Form, 51 CAN. BAR REV. 583, 593
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Small Claims Court].
10. For purposes of clarity and simplicity all discussions concerning the various aspects
of the adjudicatory process will be couched in terms of the confrontation between a single
plaintiff and defendant.
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adjudicates disputes after they have been aired by the adversaries
in a contested proceeding. This decision maker is expected to suspend judgment until the conclusion of the contest. To insure this
goal is achieved, the trier is enjoined from becoming too active a
participant in the proceedings.11 Adversary theory suggests that if
he diverges from passivity " by attempting to develop the evidence
at trial s or to arrange the compromise of the case, 1 ' he runs a serious risk of undermining his ability to evaluate neutrally the adversaries' presentations.1 5
Adversary theory further suggests that neutrality and passivity are essential, not only to decide individual cases, but also to
convince society at large that the court system is trustworthy. 6
When a judge becomes an active inquirer, he may appear to be an
advocate rather than a neutral arbiter.17 Judicial passivity helps to
11. The expectation that factfinders will be passive as well as neutral has frequently
been identified as a fundamental facet of the American adversary scheme. See C. CURTIS,
ITS YOUR LAW 1, 1 (1954); PRETRIAL DiscovERY, supra note 7, at 3; PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
supra note 7, at 22-23; Goodhart, supra note 8, at 764-65; Joint Conference on Professional
Responsibility, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J.
1159, 1160-61 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Joint Conference]; Millar, supra
note 7, at 16-19; Pound, supra note 2, at 281; The Unnecessarily Expanding Role, supra
note 7, at 13. However, certain commentators have argued that the requirement of judicial
passivity is a historical accident related to the enmity of the 18th and 19th century electorate for the judiciary. See, e.g., 9 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); Connolly, The Adversary System - Is It Any Longer Appropriate?
49 AusT. L. Rav. 439, 441 (1975); see also Scott, Trial By Jury and the Reform of Civil
Procedure,31 HARv.L. REv. 669, 677-78 (1918).
12. In this Article the term "passivity" is used to signify a considerable degree of judicial deference to the parties in the proof presenting process. However, it is not meant to
connote complete judicial quiescence or the inactivity of a "well-behaved child, [who] speaks
only when spoken to." Fuller, supra note 7, at 45.
13. Active inquiry at trial has frequently been identified as a threat to factfinder neutrality. See, e.g., PRETuAL DIscovERY, supranote 7, at 4; Adams, Towards a Mobilization of
the Adversary Process, 12 OSGOODB HALL L.J. 569, 577 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Mobilization]; Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 11, at 1161; Thibaut, Walker & Lind,
Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. Rv.386 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Legal Decisionmaking].
14. See, e.g., Flanders, Case Management in Federal Courts: Some Controversies and
Some Results, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 147, 161 (1978); Legal Decisionmaking,supra note 13, at 389
n.9.

15. As a general matter it has been said that the more active the judge becomes the
greater is the risk that he will abandon a neutral posture in the litigation. See notes 13 and
14 supra; Fuller, supra note 7, at 43-44; Damaska, supra note 8 at 1092.
16. See PRETRIAL DIscovEY, supra note 7, at 5; PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at
68.
17. See note 16 supra; Connolly, supra note 11; Mobilization, supra note 13, at 580.
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maintain the appearance of fairness which is as vital in the social
context as is fairness itself.1 8
The adjudicatory process is generally used to satisfy two
objectives: first, the search for material truth, and second, the resolution of disputes between contending parties. While most judicial
systems seek to accomplish both these goals, the procedural mechanisms best suited to the achievement of each are different. The
choice of a given set of procedural mechanisms will, perforce, favor
one or the other goal. 1 ' Where judges are assigned an active, inquisitorial part in the litigation process they will most often be expected to undertake an uninhibited quest for material truth. Perhaps the best examples of this approach are the justice systems of
the Eastern European Socialist States. 20 However, when judges are
assigned a neutral and passive function they will, in all likelihood,
be expected to devote their energies to the resolution of the disputes framed by the litigants. The American adversary system has
traditionally accepted the latter approach and thereby favored the
goal of resolving disputes rather than searching for material
truth.2"
18. See notes 16 and 17 supra;see also Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Gas Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice"); see also, Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 172 n.19 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Throughout this Article reference will be made to a number of federal court opinions and
rules. While such opinions and rules do not necessarily reflect the condition of the adversary
process in every jurisdiction in the United States, they have been selected because they
illustrate significant trends in American jurisprudence.
19. See M. CAPpnELIu
& J.JOLOWCZ, PUBLIC INTEREST PARTIES AND T1lE ACTIvE RoLE
OF THE JUDGE IN Crim LITIGATION 244-77 (1975) [hereinafter cited as THE ACTIVE ROLE OF
Tim JUDGE]; see also Millar, supra note 7.
20. See Tan AcrIvE RoLE OF TmE JUDGE, supra note 19, at 174-77. In Poland for
instance:
The principle of material truth is placed at the forefront of the principles of civil
procedure, which means of necessity that the court cannot limit itself strictly to
the evidence produced by the parties, even though they are themselves placed
under a positive duty to make the circumstances of the case clear in accordance
with the truth and without concealing any fact; the court even exercises a control over admissions, discontinuances and voluntary settlements, at least to the
extent that it is not obliged to accept the act of the party as final but can examine it to see if, for example, it is in conformity with the law.
Id. at 176.
21. PRERIAL DiscovERY, supra note 7, at 13-14; H. HART & A. SAcKs, THE LEGAL PROcEss: BAsic PRoBLEMs IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 366-68 (unpublished manuscript 1958) [hereinafter cited as THE LEGAL PRocEss]; THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE, supra
note 9, at 78; Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 15 JUDGES' J. 43, 46 (1976);
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While either a judge or jury may serve as trier in most kinds of
cases heard in American courts, the decision maker preferred in
adversary doctrine is the jury. The judge is deeply enmeshed in the
pretrial and trial process. He is the supervisor of discovery, the adjudicator of motions, the enforcer of the rules of evidence, and the

declarer of law. His passivity and neutrality will doubtless be
strained as he performs these functions. 22 It is to the jury's advantage, at least in the adversary context, that it does not face similar
strains, and it will seldom be prematurely drawn into the contest.' s
A second advantage of the jury is that its members are likely to be
free of those predispositions a judge develops because of his training and daily experience in handling legal matters. 24 Further, be-

cause the jury comprises a number of individuals, the prejudices of
any single juror will not usually destroy the capacity of the jury to
fulfill the adjudicatory function in a neutral manner.25 This is to be
The Unnecessarily Expanding Role, supra note 7, at 11-12.
A number of American judges and scholars have criticized the adversary method and its
bias in favor of resolving disputes rather than searching for material truth. See, e.g., J.
FRANK, supra note 7; Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation,
70 F.R.D. 83 (1976); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Search for Truth]; Pound, supra note 2.
Several arguments may be made in defense of the adversarial commitment to dispute
resolution. First, the vagaries of human memory and expression will often render the discovery of material truth impossible. Under such circumstances the commitment of the judicial
process to the search for truth may be considered both naive and futile. See, e.g., A.
EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JUISPRUDENCE 280-81 (1971); Uviller, The Advocate, the
Truth, and JudicialHackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel'sIdea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067,
1076-79 (1975). Second, commitment to an uninhibited search for material truth can foster a
willingness to disregard personal dignity and privacy for the sake of uncovering all the facts.
Adversarial emphasis on dispute resolution lessens the risk of this sort of abuse. See D.
LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW 412-13 (1960) [hereinafter cited as THE
PARENCHYMA OF LAW]; THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE, supranote 9, at 46-47; Freedman, Judge
Frankel'sSearch for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 1065 (1975); Kaplan, Of Mabrus and
Zorgs, 66 CAL. L. REV. 987, 990 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Frankel, The Adversary Judge, 54 Tax. L. Rav. 465 (1976).
23. Members of the jury are only likely to be drawn into the contest in those few cases
in which extensive pretrial publicity causes irremediable prejudice against one of the parties. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1963).
24. See C. CURTIS, supra note 11, at 97-98; C. JOINER, CIvM JUSTICE AND THE JURY 3435 (1962); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 7-10 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
THE AMERICAN JURY]; THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 112-13; The Unnecessarily Expanding Role, supra note 7, at 20. But see note 28 infra.
25. Twelve person juries have generally been credited with the ability to overcome the
prejudices of individual jurors. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN JURY, supra note 24, at 20; THE
PARENCHYMA OF LAW, supra note 21, at 57-58 citing Railroad Company v. Stout, 17 Wall
657, 664 (1873); THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 111. With respect to juries of
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contrasted with the situation of the solitary judge whose biases frequently influence the decisions he renders.2 Finally, through voir
dire and peremptory challenge, jurors with manifest or latent
biases can be removed from the decision making panel, thereby
augmenting the likelihood of neutral adjudication. There is no adequate mechanism to insure judicial neutrality.27 For all these reasons the jury is more likely than the judge to meet adversarial expectations and -remain neutral and passive until the end of the
28
contest.
A procedural principle of the American adversary system intiless than twelve but more than five there has been lively debate concerning the ability to
control juror bias. For materials promoting juries of less than twelve, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) and sources cited therein.
For materials critical of the capabilities of juries of less than twelve, see, e.g., Lempert,
Uncovering 'Nondiscernable'Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases,
73 MICH. L. REV. 644 (1975); Zeisel, And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the
Federal Jury, 38 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 710 (1971) [hereinafter cited as And Then There Were
None]; see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) and materials cited therein especially
at n.10. With respect to juries of five or fewer there is general agreement that the risk of
prejudicial influence substantially increases. See Ballew v. Georgia, supra.
26. Even a significant number of judges view juries as more likely than judges to be
neutral decision makers. See Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 9-10
(1966); Note, With Love in Their Hearts but Reform on Their Minds: How Trial Judges
View the Civil Jury, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 178, 185 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Reform on Their Minds] (twenty-nine percent of judges queried indicated that "juries are
more often 'neutral' than judges who often have fixed views"). This view is apparently
shared by a significant number of the litigants who opt for jury trial. See ANNUAL CHIEF
JusTicE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES, THE AMERICAN
JURY SYSTEM-FINAL REPORT 18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]; DELAY IN TIIE
COURT, supra note 1, at 92; The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role, supra note 7, at 36.
27. A number of states do have what amounts to a peremptory challenge system for the
removal of judges. See Project, Disqualificationof Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common
Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 48 ORE. L. REV. 311, 347
(1969); Note, Caesar's Wife Revisited-JudicialDisqualification After the 1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1201, 1217-18 (1977). However, it is generally agreed that in
the federal system and in most states recusal and disqualification mechanisms are woefully
inadequate to resolve problems of judicial bias and hostility. See, e.g., The Unnecessarily
Expanding Role, supra note 7, at 43; Comment, Disqualificationof FederalJudges for Bias
or Prejudice, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 236 (1978); Comment, Disqualifying Federal District
Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L. Ray. 109 (1974).
28. The general theoretical superiority of the jury does not mean that juries will always
be the best possible factfinders. The racial, ethnic, or social composition of a jury may have
an overwhelming impact on factfinding in a particular case. See, e.g., D. CARTER, SCOTTSBORo: A TRAGEDY OF THE AmimcAN SOUTH (1969) (detailed study of the plight of the nine
young blacks accused of raping two white women in Alabama in 1932-white juries displayed irremediable racial bias throughout the judicial proceedings held in the case); Contrst Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 486, 502-04 (1975).
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mately connected with the requirements of decision making passivity and neutrality, is that the parties are responsible for the development of all the evidence upon which the decision will be based.29
This principle insulates the trier from involvement in the contest.
It also encourages the adversaries to find the most persuasive evidence and present it to the decision maker.30 By placing the evidentiary burden on the parties, the trier has the added advantage
of seeing what each side believes to be its most persuasive and consequential proof. The choices made by the parties help focus the
litigation upon the issues of greatest importance to them and facilitate decisions tailored to their needs.31
The American adversary system relies on a class of skilled professional advocates to assemble and present testimony upon which
decisions will be based. The advocates are expected to provide the
forensic talents necessary to organize the evidence and formulate
the issues; their job is to insure a sharp adversarial contest.3 2 If
29. See THE ACTr Ro.E OF THE JuDGE,.s up a note 19, at 247-48; PROCEDURAL JUSsupra note 7:
In the adversary model each party to the dispute is usually represented by an
openly biased advocate who is charged with exercising his party's control while
seeking to establish the validity of his or her contentions. The roles of adversarial attorneys are therefore somewhat anomalous: overtly they act in contentious support of conflicting claims, yet they constitute a tacit coalition to maintain a high degree of disputant control over the process.
Id. at 23; Damaska, supra note 8, at 1090-91; Millar, supra note 7, at 16-18; Mobilization,
supra note 13, at 576.
TICE,

30.

See PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 28-40 (experimental finding that attor-

neys in adversary setting "sought more information" than attorneys in inquisitorial setting
"when the distribution of fact [was] unfavorable"); Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibilities
of the Civil Practitioner,in EDUCATION IN THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIEs OF THE LAwYER, 152 (D. Weckstein ed. 1970); Report of the Joint Conference,supra note 11, at 1160-61.
In response to this proposition critics have claimed that the parties will find and utilize
the evidence best suited to their arguments but will not look for or disclose the evidence
most likely to reveal material truth. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 7, at 80-85.
31. The benefit of such a focus is measurable in economic terms. Professors Lea and
Walker suggest that where an "autocratic," judge dominated procedure is used to resolve
disputes a court will often reach decisions not well fitted to the needs of the litigants. Such
decisions significantly increased the "impositional costs" (i.e., costs attributable to an unbargained for and poorly tailored resolution of a problem) of adjudication. Such costs can in
large measure be avoided in a system that relies on participant direction and control. Lea &
Walker, Efficient Procedure,57 N. CAR. L. REv. 361, 376 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Efficient Procedure].
32. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1972); Gideon v. Wainright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); PRmAL DISCOVERY
supra note 7, at 15.
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advocates fail to carry out their duty, development of the case will
falter and the adversary process will be undermined. Such failure
also increases the likelihood that judges, either because of their desire to discover material truth or to insure balanced presentations,
will assume responsibility for the development of cases.83 This in
turn may threaten a judge's neutrality and the accuracy of the decision rendered.3 '
7
s6
Elaborate sets of procedural, 85 evidentiary, and ethical
rules are also integral parts of the adversary process. 8 Procedural
rules serve at least two vital functions in the adversary setting.
First, they bring about a climactic confrontation in a single session
or set of sessions.39 In a short period of time, this confrontation
presents the adjudicator with all the information used in the formulation of a decision. Such an arrangement intensifies the clash
between the adversaries, diminishes the opportunity for the trier
to undertake an independent factual investigation 4 0 and helps to
insure the trier's neutrality and passivity. Second, rules of procedure help insure that each adversary will be afforded an equal
opportunity to make the best possible case. Foremost among the
procedural equalizers is discovery. Information crucial to the pros33. See The Search for Truth, supra note 21:
For many other judges, however, probably a majority at one time or another,
the habit of adversariness tends to be rechanneled, at least in some measure,
into a combative yearning for truth. With perhaps a touch of the convert's zeal,
they may suffer righteously when the truth is being blocked or mutilated, turn
against former comrades in the arena, feel (and sometimes yield to) the urge to
spring into the contest with brilliant questions that light the way.
Id. at 1034; The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role, supra note 7, at 7.
34. See notes 13-15 supra;Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L.
Rv. 1, 16 (1973); The Search for Truth, supra note 21, at 1043; Uviller, supra note 21, at
1069.
35. For the purposes of this Article the rules of procedure shall be defined as all those
regulations established to govern the litigation process, from the initiation of a lawsuit to
the resolution of that lawsuit with the exception of those rules governing the presentation of
evidence as defined in note 36 infra.
36. For the purposes of this Article the rules of evidence shall be defined as those regulations established to govern the presentation of testimony and other proofs at trial.
37. For the purposes of this Article the rules of ethics shall be defined as those regulations established to govern the professional conduct of attorneys.
38. See PfRrTRIA DiscoVny, supra note 7, at 15.
39. See THE AcTiv RoLE OF THE JUDGE, supra note 19, at 246-47; Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English Civil Procedure, 69 MICH. L.
Rav. 821, 841 (1971).
40. See note 39 supra.
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ecution of a case may not be equally available to each of the liti-

gants. Discovery, at least in theory, eliminates the possibility that
one party will be able to profit from information unavailable to his
opponent or withhold pertinent information from that opponent.4
Another constituent part of the adversary system is a detailed
set of evidentiary rules. Because its fundamental purpose is to pro-

tect the integrity of the evidentiary process, categories of evidence
that have been determined to be unreliable, and therefore, capable

of misleading the trier, are excluded by evidentiary rules. 42 The
hearsay rule illustrates this proposition. Hearsay is inadmissible
because the reliability of out of court statements is subject to question and cannot be tested during the trial by the procedures usually available for that purpose.43 A number of other evidentiary

rules work in similar fashion to bar the introduction of untrustworthy material." The rules of evidence are also designed to insulate
41. At about the time of its introduction discovery was bitterly attacked as antithetical
to the adversary process. Discovery was said to undercut the efficacy of the adversary system by allowing counsel for one party to profit parasitically from the efforts of his opponent.
PRETRiAL DiscovERY, supra note 7, at 11 and materials cited at n.9 therein. Despite these
early claims, discovery has not served to dampen the adversary spirit. Rather, it has been
fully integrated into the adversarial process. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
709 (1974); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
It should be noted that discovery devices have been abused. Some critics have claimed
that discovery frequently serves to defeat justice by delaying cases or by allowing the weak
to be overborne by the strong. See, e.g., Burger, How to Break the Logjam in the Courts,
U.S. N.ws & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 1977, at 24; Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have
Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 202 (1976); Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and
Correction,80 F.R.D. 219, 221-22 (1979).
42. See Goodhart, supra note 8, at 760-61; Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance:
CounteringNegative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. Rv.
1011, 1015-16 (1978); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. Rav. 988, 989-90
(1973) [hereinafter cited as The Harm of Harmless Error].
43.

See THE PARENCHYMA OF LAw, supra note 21, at 62-64; THE TRiAL OF THE FUTURE,

supra note 9, at 27-28; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 1362.
44. See, e.g., FED. R. Evw. 701 (opinion testimony by lay witness); FED. R. EvID. 901
(requirement of authentication or identification); FED. R. Evm. 1002 (requirement of
original).
The hearsay, opinion, best evidence, authentication, and similar rules are not generally
utilized in the continental, inquisitorial adjudicatory process. These rules have been criticized by a number of scholars because they "suppress" valuable information. See Kunert,
Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence Rules Under the Common
Law System and the Civil Law System of 'Free Proof' in the German Code of Criminal
Procedure,16 BUFFALO L. REv. 122, 127 (1967); see also A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 21, at
264-65. In response to this criticism it has been asserted that the adversary process serves
goals other than the disclosure of material truth and the rules of evidence play a part in
achieving these goals. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text, supra.
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the decision maker from exposure to evidence that, although reliable in itself, poses a serious threat of exciting prejudice against one
of the parties. 45 This objective is advanced by rules which prohibit
introduction of evidence that is more prejudicial than probative,'4
as well as by those which bar the use of evidence descriptive of one
or another personal attribute of one of the litigants. 7
Since the rough-and-tumble of adversary procedure exacerbates the natural tendency of advocates to seek to win by any
means available,'48 the third set of rules upon which the adversary
process relies places ethical constraints on the lawyer advocates.
To insure the integrity of the process certain tactics are forbidden,
such as those designed to harass or intimidate an opponent,' 9 as
well as those intended to mislead or prejudice the trier of fact.50 In
addition to their prohibitory function, the canons of ethics are intended to promote vigorous adversarial contests. They attempt to
achieve this end by requiring that each attorney zealously represent his client's interests at all times. 1
45. See R. LE PERT & S. SALTZURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EWDE.NCE, 147-48 (1977);
Legal Decisionmaking, supra note 13, at 387-88 n.4; see also Lempert, Modelling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1036 (1977).
46. See, e.g., Fn. R. Evm. 403 (exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time).
47. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 404 (character evidence not admissible to prove conduct);
see also FED. R. Evm. 609 (impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime).
48. See PRETRIAL DiscovERY, supra note 7, at 6-7; The Search for Truth, supra note 21,
at 1037.
49. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPONSmiLrrY DR 7-102(A)(1) (a lawyer
shall not undertake any action that "would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another."); DR 7-105(A) ("A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.").
50. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REssoNsmmrrY DR 7-102(A)(2)-(6) (a lawyer
shall not "knowingly advance" an unwarranted claim, conceal information he is required to
disclose, "knowingly use perjured testimony," "knowingly make a false statement of law or
fact," or "participate in the creation or preservation of evidence" he knows to be false); DR
7-102(B) (a lawyer is required to inform those affected of any fraud perpetrated by a client);
DR 7-106(B) (a lawyer shall disclose "legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to
him to be directly adverse to the position of his client"); DR-106(C) (a lawyer appearing
before a tribunal shall not allude to irrelevant or inadmissible evidence, ask a question he
does not believe is relevant for the purpose of degrading a witness or other person, "assert
his personal knowledge of facts," "assert his personal opinion as to the justness of the
cause," "engage in undignified or discourteous conduct," or "intentionally or habitually vio-

late any established rule of procedure or evidence").
51.

A central theme of the ABA CODE OF PROFEssioNAL RESPONSmILITY is attorney loy-

alty to, and zealous advocacy on behalf of his client. Such behavior is mandated in the
disciplinary rules which accompany at least four of the nine Canons of the Code. See ABA
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To help insure adherence to the rules and principles regulating the adversary process, a system of appellate courts has been
incorporated into the adversary framework. 52 Appellate judges review the records of trial proceedings and determine whether the
various legal prescriptions have been obeyed. If error is found, appellate courts are authorized to utilize any one of a number of rem-

edies. Available remedies include modification, vacation, or reversal of a lower court's judgment to redress the harm done. 53
Appellate review also encourages attorneys and judges at the trial
level to adhere to the requirements of the adversary process in order to avoid reversal on appeal."

II.

THE MEASURED PACE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS

The American adversary process is not designed to adjudicate
individual cases speedily. Rather, almost all the basic components
of the process serve to retard the progress of cases toward resolution. The process as a whole appears intentionally designed to increase the amount of time a decisionmaker spends considering
each case. The cost of such an approach is clearly measurable in
terms of delay.
Adversary theory requires the judge to remain passive until
CODE OF PROFSSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons
THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE JUDGE, supra note 19,

4-7 and accompanying Disciplinary Rules;

at 240-41; see also Freedman, Professional

Responsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 1469, 1470 (1966).
52. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring); Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids:Reshaping the JudicialSystem,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901, 910 (1971); Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that Are Civil to Promote Justice That Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REv. 797, 803 (1971).
While appellate review serves to help insure the integrity of the adversarial process it
also serves a number of other ends as well. These include appellate judges using "the cases
before them as vehicles for stating and applying constitutional principles, for authoritatively
interpreting statutes, for formulating and expressing policy on legal issues of system-wide
concern, for developing the common law, and for supervising each level of the system below
them." Hufstedler, supra at 910; see B. CARnozo, Tan NATURE OF THE JuDIcIL PROCasS,
passim (1921).
53. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §2106:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgement, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the
entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further
proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
54. See R. TPAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARmLESS ERROR 50, 80-81 (1970); The Harm of
Harmless Error, supra note 42, at 1014-15 n.89.
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the conclusion of the advocates' presentations. He is not free to
conduct an independent inquiry or otherwise accelerate the pace of
proceedings. The judge's passivity undoubtedly slows adjudication. 5 When a jury is used as decisionmaker, proceedings are even
slower due to the extra time spent selecting the jurors and presenting the case.58 Passivity is relied upon in the adversary framework
to insure that the trier will remain neutral until he renders his decision. Neutrality, in turn, tends to insure the integrity of adversary deliberations. In this context, as well as a number of others,
the adversary system appears to sacrifice speed in an effort to protect the probity of the process.57
The rules of procedure essential to the regulation of the adversary contest also slow the pace of litigation. Adversary procedure
assures each party ample opportunity to prepare and present his
case.5 This preparation and presentation time, dependent as it is
55. See PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 6-7 (party control over procedure is
"time-consuming"); Efficient Procedure,supra note 31, at 376 (participant control increases
"transactional costs"); but see THE ACTIvE ROLE OF THE JUDGE, supra note 19:
The first, which can be put very shortly, is simply that the greater the activity that is required of the court in the course of the litigation the greater the
work load of judges and court officials. It has to be borne in mind, therefore, that
even though a transfer of initiative from the parties to the court might improve
the efficiency.with which individual cases are handled, the overall effect of such
a transfer on the ability of the courts to get through their total work load in a
reasonable time would actually be adverse.
Id. at 265.
56. See DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 1, at 8-9 (bench trials are "about 40 percent
less time-consuming" than jury trials); THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 105-06
(jury trial perhaps "two and one-half times as long as" nonjury case); but see T. CHURCH,
JR., JUSTICE DELAYED THE PACE OF LmGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 32 (1978) ("Courts
that dispose of a relatively high proportion of their civil cases by jury trial are neither less
productive nor slower than courts with lower trial utilization."); THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW,
supra note 21, at 66 ("[The] jury, by its very nature, promotes expedition of decision-the
jury must decide, or be discharged. Judges often can, and too often unfortunately do, delay
decision indefinitely.").
57. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) ("[I]n large measure because of
the many procedural safeguards provided an accused, the ordinary procedures for criminal
prosecutions are designed to move at a deliberate pace."); California Apparel Creators v.
Weider of California, Inc., 162 F.2d 893, 903 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting) (justice
depends on a "thorough, though dilatory, examination of the facts"); Miller, A Programfor
the Elimination of the Hardship of Litigation Delay, in SELECTED READINGS: COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY 2 (G. Winters ed. 1971).
58. See, e.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (defendant in nonjury criminal
case has a constitutional right to make a final summation); PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY IN LITIGATION 85 (1958) (remarks
of then Judge William J. Brennan, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]; Miller, supra
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on the vagaries of legal practice and advocate efficiency, does not
lead to nearly as swift a decision as would a process primarily
concerned with judicial inquiry rather than party presentation.59
However, by allowing both sides to be heard in full, the adversary
process tends to expand the pool of information available to the
decisionmaker. This arguably increases the likelihood the trier will
be able to render a decision that satisfies the needs of the
litigants.20
The use of a strict set of rules of evidence to prevent the introduction of prejudicial or misleading information slows the adversary process. Before evidence may be introduced its pedigree6 1 and
trustworthiness 62 -must be stipulated or demonstrated. Testimony
from witnesses may be elicited only be means of a series of precisely formulated questions. These procedures invite careful scrutiny of each question and each answer. It is this careful control of
the fact gathering process that undoubtedly slows the tempo of adversary proceedings.6
Finally, the adversary process relies upon appellate review to
insure obedience to the codes regulating ligitation.6 In effect, the
appellate mechanism gives each party a chance to be heard at least
twice. Appellate review undercuts finality of judgment and thereby
allows litigants to prolong the adjudicary process substantially.65
Again, the adversary method appears to sacrifice speed in an effort
to enhance the integrity of deliberations.
III. THE RHETORIC OF SWIFT AND CERTAIN JUSTICE AND THE
DECLINING USE OF ADVERSARY PROCEDURE IN AMERICAN COURTS
Notwithstanding the claim that ours is an adversary system,
note 57.
59. See note 55 supra.
60. See note 31 supra.
61. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 901 (requirement of authentication or identification); FED.
R. EvID. 1002 (requirement of original).
62. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 801-04 (the hearsay rule and its exceptions).
63. See DELAY INTHE COURT, supra note 1, at 100; Douglas, Perspectives on Justice in
a Changing Society, in JuSTCE ON TRIAL 14 (D. Douglas & P. Noble eds. 1971); Redish,
supra note 28, at 506-07; Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1361.
64. See note 52 supra.
65. See Hazard, After the Trial Court-The Realities of Appellate Review, in Tim
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAw EXPLOSION (H. Jones ed. 1965); Pound, supra note 2, at
287-88; Interview with Chief Justice WarrenE. Burger, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 14,
1970, at 35 [hereinafter cited as "BurgerInterview'].
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there are many indications that reliance on the adversary principle

is declining. This decline has been accompanied by judicial and
scholarly criticism that various facets of the adversary process are
delay ridden and inefficient. While criticism premised upon delay
has not been the sole reason for change, 6 it has profoundly affected the quality of debate concerning retention of the adversary
process and has greatly facilitated the adoption of nonadversarial
66. It is beyond the scope of this Artiple to analyze in detailall the reasons for the
decline of the adversary system. However, it seems relatively clear that certain economic
and social forces have served to weaken the foundation upon which the adversary system
was erected. The modern adversary concept would appear to have been the product of the
laissez faire philosophy relied upon in England and America in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries to order economic, social, and legal affairs. See J. FRANK, supra note 7, at
92; Frankel, The Conflict Between Self Interest and Justice, 16 JUDGES' J. 8 (Summer 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Self Interest and Justice] (for a somewhat different version of the
same materials see Toward Public Justice,supra note 7); see also M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 xv, 101-08 (1977). This laissez faire philosophy
produced a legal system preoccupied with the claims and rights of individual litigants. See
J. FRANK, supra note 7; Self Interest and Justice, supra.
The individualistic adversary approach came under increasing attack from the end of the
Nineteenth Century on. It was, to a significant degree, inconsistent with what Max Weber
has described as the requirement of modern "bureaucratic" government and industry, that
official business be dispatched with "utmost possible speed, precision, definiteness and continuity . . ." M. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND Socima 350 (M. Rheinstein
ed. 1954). It was also at odds with the growing demand for a sort of "social justice" that
placed equality ahead of "private freedom." Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of
Civil Procedure-Reforms and Trends in Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH. L. REV.
847, 883-84 (1971). Further, it may have been incapable of handling the great volume of
cases generated by a complex industralized society.
One response to the problems posed by the adversary system was to narrow its jurisdiction. A familiar example of this trend was the development of workmen's compensation
boards to resolve questions of worker injuries. See Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process
of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REv. 786, 801-02 (1967); see also Small Claims Court, supra
note 9, at 607-08 (creation of small claims courts as a retreat from adversarial process).
More recently a number of influential commentators have recommended that judicial adversary procedure be even more narrowly circumscribed. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL Vimw passim (1973) (recommending nonadversarial approach to civil
rights, railway workers' injury, seamen's injury, antitrust, and bther sorts of litigation); Bell,
Crisis in the Courts: Proposalsfor Change,31 VAm. L. REv. 3, 7 (1978) (advocating arbitration as an alternative to adversarial adjudication in certain kinds of federal civil cases).
A second response to the problems posed by the adversary process was for the courts to
alter the manner in which they conducted business. In 1976 Professors Friedman and Percival undertook an analysis of the workload of courts in two California counties from 1890 to
1970. Their conclusion was that over the years these courts devoted an ever decreasing
amount of time to resolving disputes between adversaries and an ever increasing amount of
time to handling "administrative" functions. Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts:
Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 L. & Soc'y REV. 267, 296-301 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as A Tale of Two Courts].

1980]

DECLINING ADVERSARY SYSTEM

methods.
In many instances, the availability of adversary procedure has
been curtailed or one of the fundamental components of the process has been altered. Change has, for the most part, been linked
to the rhetoric of swift and certain justice. It has usually been accomplished without discussion of the implications of reform on the
survival of the adversary method of adjudication. The means by
which change has been made, rather than the merit of any particular modification, is the subject of this section. In succeeding sections, the wisdom of dismantling the adversary process in this
manner will be considered.
The critics of adversary procedure have pressed their arguments concerning delay with remarkable rhetorical vigor.67 Prominent members of both bench and bar have contended that delay
causes a host of grave problems. These problems include the denial
of justice,6 8 the destruction of the populace's faith in the courts,"
and the increase of crime.70 Some critics have portrayed delay as a
menace to the very survival of the judicial branch of government.
Based on this sort of criticism, reformers have sought to curtail the
67. See, e.g., M. FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTICE, 54-72 (1974); J. FRANK, supra
note 8, at 2-28; PROCEEDINGS, supra note 58, at 138-39; A Call for Action, supra note 6;
O'Neill, How to Force Faster Litigation, 18 JUDGES' J. 7 (Winter 1979); Pound, supra note
2; Rosenberg, supra note 52.
68. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 58, at 48-49 (remarks of Cecil E. Burney reiterating proposition that "justice delayed is justice denied"); Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 932 ("delays in trials are often one of the gravest threats to
individual rights"); A Call for Action, supra note 6, at 739.
69. See, e.g., Deficiencies in Judicial Administration: Hearings on S. 3289, The National Court Assistance Act, Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery
of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1970)
(statement of William H. Adkins II) ("I believe it is delay which forms the basic reason for
citizen dissatisfaction with our courts.").
70. See, e.g., Burger, The Views of the Chief Justice, LIn Aug. 7, 1970:
Many people, though not all, will be deterred from serious crimes if they
believe that justice is swift and sure. Today no one thinks that it is. If there is a
general impression that the administration of justice is not working, one important result is that the deterrent effect of law and punishment is impaired or lost.
Id. at 26; Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 808-09.
71. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 66, at 3 (the federal courts "have more work than
they can properly do" and "are faced with the prospect of a breakdown"); McDonald, A
Center Report/CriminalJustice, CENTER MAGAzINE, Nov. 1968, at 69 (quoting remarks of
then United States Court of Appeals Judge Warren Burger) ("The American system, up to
the time of the final verdict and appeal, puts all the emphasis on techniques, devices, mechanisms. It is the most elaborate system ever devised by a society. It is so elaborate that in
many places it is breaking down. It is not working.").
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use of adversary process. To accomplish this end, critics have
rather than adjudication be used to resolve
urged that settlement
72
most disputes.
Settlement is not necessarily antithetical to the adversary process. A high percentage of settlements may even be intrinsic to an
adversarial system. 73 Today, over ninety percent of all cases are
settled,7 4 and the proportion of settlements is growing.7 5 If this
trend continues, the percentage of settlements may become so
great and the pressure for settlement so intense, adversarial reliance on contested trials will be compromised.7
R. MERHIGE, JR., & A.
(remarks of Judge Hubert Will at a panel presentation for newly appointed federal district judges sponsored by
the Federal Judicial Center) [hereinafter cited as THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SETrLEMENT PROCESS]; Flanders, supra note 14, at 160 (citing the remarks of Judge Ruggero Aldisert); Title, New Settlement Techniques for the Trial Judge, 18 JUDGES' J. 42, 49 (Winter
1979).
73. See DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 1, at 108; Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining,13 L. & Soc'v REv. 199, 200 (1979); Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1022 (1974).
74. See DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 1, at 108 (only 2 or 3 percent of all claims are
tried to verdict); Hoffman, Plea Bargainingand the Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499 (1971)
(approximately 90 percent of all defendants enter guilty pleas in criminal cases); Rubin, The
Managed Calendar: Some PragmaticSuggestions about Achieving the Just, Speedy, and
Inexpensive Determinatiohof Civil Cases in Federal Court, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 135, 137 (1978)
(92 percent of civil cases filed in the United States District Courts "were terminated prior to
trial"); Thompson, How to Get the Case Flow Moving, 18 JUDGES' J. 13, 14 (Winter 1979)
("well over 90 percent" of all civil cases "are settled before full trial and judgment").
75. See A Tale of Two Courts, supra note 66, at 286-87 (significant rise in percentage
of uncontested judgments since 1890); Lempert, More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring
Changes in the 'DisputeSettlement Function'of Trial Courts, 13 L. & Soc'Y REV. 92, 101
n.11 (1979) (in 1970, 18 percent fewer cases resolved by contested judgment in Alameda
72. See, e.g., T. CHURCH, supra note 56, at 34 n.25; H. WILL,
RUBIN, THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS (1977)

County than in 1890, 14 percent reduction in contested judgments in San Benito County

during same time period).
76. See DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 1, at 108 ("As a matter of policy, it is very
doubtful whether the 2 or 3 percent of all claims that are tried to verdict should be reduced
any further. It is quite possible they constitute the core of cases which ought to be litigated.") (emphasis in the original); Watkins, Remedies for Court Congestion, in JUSTICE ON
TmAL 179 (D. Douglas & P. Noble eds. 1971); Greene, Court Reform: What Purpose?, 58
A.B.A.J. 247, 250 (1972) ("pleas of guilty would be presumed to be the result of undue
influence whenever their rate exceeded 90 or 95 percent of all convictions in a particular
court").
Some commentators feel that the percentage of settlements has already compromised
adversarial reliance on contested trials. See Bazelon, New Gods for Old: 'Efficient' Courts in
a Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 653, 663-64 (1971) (criminal plea bargaining seeks
to persuade "defendants to forego the very rights that government is established to secure"
and has substituted the values of "the marketplace" for those appropriate to the criminal
justice system); Blumberg, The Practiceof Law as Confidence Game: OrganizationalCoop-
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The upward surge in the rate of settlements has been accompanied by judicial adoption of the rhetoric of swift and certain justice. In addition, the idea that routine cases should not be tried
has been frequently endorsed. This is perhaps most apparent in
the criminal context, where plea bargaining has received official judicial sanction. Almost without exception, judicial decisions approving the components of the plea system have been justified in
terms of the need for speedy adjudication as well as conservation
of judicial resources.7
A typical holding is the Supreme Court's opinion in
Santobello v. New York.7 8 Chief Justice Burger writing for the
Court stated:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and
the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining," is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the
States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times
the number of judges and court facilities.7

The Supreme Court has not, in Santobello, or any other plea bargaining case, considered the potentially adverse effect of bargaining on the adversary process. It has apparently assumed that savings in judicial time and resources justify arrangements in which
tion of a Profession, 1 L. & Soc'y Rzv. 15, 18-24 (1967) (the plea system has "coopted" the

defense bar); Frankel, supra note 66, at 10-11 (the trial has become the "unused centerpiece" of our justice system).
77. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222 n.12 (1978); Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("Whatever
might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concommitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system.
Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned ....
Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources."); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (see
text accompanying note 79 infra); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970):
For the State there are also advantages-the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial
resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of
the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can
sustain its burden of proof.
Id. at 752 (footnote omitted); see also Bosco, Some Comments Concerning the Roles of
Judges, Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys in Plea Bargaining, 1978 TIUAI LAW. Gums
377, 388; Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & Soc'y
REv. 261, 262 (1979).
78. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
79. Id. at 260.
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defendants are strongly encouraged to trade their right to trial for
consideration in sentencing. s0
The reformers have not only sought to reduce the number of
cases tried by adversarial methods, they have attempted to alter
the nature of the process itself. Basic components of the adversary
system, such as judicial passivity, advocate responsibility for the
development of cases, jury primacy, traditional rules of procedure
and evidence, and thoroughgoing appellate review, have all been
sharply criticized. Passivity has been challenged in a number of
contexts. In the name of efficiency, judges have been admonished
to take charge of settlement negotiations at the earliest moment,8 1
to supervise the bargaining process, 8 2 to render opinions concern-

ing issues not yet litigated, and to settle as many lawsuits as possible.' A large number of judges have adopted these and similar
practices. 5 The chief justification for change has been the claimed
need for greater speed and efficiency.86 Neither critics nor settlement oriented judges have paid much attention to apparent conflicts created between their approach and the principle of passivity, which has traditionally been viewed as limiting a judge's
80. For intimations that such an assumption is unwarranted, see note 74 supra.
81. See, e.g., THE RoE OF THE JUDGE INTHE SETTLEMENT PROCESS, supra note 72, at 2;
Title, supra note 72, at 44.
82. See, e.g., THE ROLE OF Tm JUDGE m THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS, supra note 72, at 5;
Flanders, supra note 14, at 160; Lambros, Plea Bargainingand the Sentencing Process, 53
F.R.D. 509 (1971).
83. See, e.g., Title, supra note 72, at 44.
84. See, e.g., THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SErLEMENT PROCESS, supra note 72, at 1;
Flanders, supra note 14, at 160; Title, supra note 72, at 42, 49.
85.

See, e.g., THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW, supra note 21, at 27; Bazelon, supra note 76, at

663-64; Church, Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 166, 175 (1978);
Lambros, supra note 82, at 514-15; Title, supra note 72, passim.
86. See materials cited in notes 81-84 supra. However, research data have failed to
support the proposition that active judicial participation in the settlement process increases
the speed or efficiency of the courts. See Church, supra note 85:
Those courts which exert the most effort in settling cases do not necessarily
dispose of more cases per judge than those courts where less judicial settlement
effort is expended. About the only obvious relationship ... is the perfect inverse relationship between amount of court settlement activity and median disposition time. The most settlement-intensive courts are the slowest courts.
Id. at 176 (emphasis in the original).
There is even some support for the proposition that courts utilize heavy caseloads and
attendant delay as "an excuse" to rely on plea bargaining rather than undertake the more
onerous task of conducting adversary trials. See Rubin, How We Can Improve Judicial
Treatment of Individual Cases Without SacrificingIndividual Rights: The Problems of the
CriminalLaw, 70 F.R.D. 176, 185 n.26 (1976).
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involvment in the compromise of a case. 7
The champions of speedier litigation have challenged the principle of decisionmaking passivity in situations other than settle-

ment. Generally, passivity has been said to undermine the ability
of the trial judge to manage the cases before him efficiently.88 The

judge who passively awaits the development of the evidence by the
parties is said to be unable to protect proceedings from delay and

distortion caused by unskilled or excessively contentious counsel.89
He is also said to be ill-equipped to meet the challenge of complex
litigation.9 0 Critics suggest that the cure for these problems is an

increase in judicial authority to manage litigation both in and out
of the courtroom. 91

A marked expansion of the managerial powers of the trial
judge has been associated with this- assault on passivity. Today,

judges are free to take an active part in both the preparation and
presentation of lawsuits. Tools such as the pretrial conference and
pretrial order are regularly used by judges to determine the pace

and, to some extent, the direction of litigation.92 Rules regulating
judicial involvement at trial have been steadily liberalized. Judges

have been ceded extensive authority to question witnesses called
by the parties. 93 They have also been given broad powers to call
87. See note 14 supra.
88. See, e.g., Oleck, What to Do About Delay in Court, in SELECTED READINGS: COURT
CONGESTION AND DELAY, supra note 57, at 72 (citing remarks of Judge Irving Kaufman);
Flanders, supra note 14, at 149-50 (citing remarks of Judge Hubert Will); Pound, supra
note 2, at 281-82.
89. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 8, at 128 ("Counsel, unhappily, may be a longwinded, incompetent, contentious boob, and yet under the pure application of the adversary
theory, the court has no function but to sit in place, rule on objections, and give instructions
to the jury."); Burger, supra note 21, at 91; Pound, supra note 2, at 281-82.
90. See, e.g., Efficient Procedure, supra note 31, at 362 (citing Boyer, Alternatives to
Administrative Trial-type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. Rv.111, 145-46 (1972)); Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1354-55.
91. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 58, at 128 (reproducing remarks of Judge Holtzoff); O'Neill, supra note 67, at 7; Rubin, supra note 74, at 136, 140; Solomon, Techniques for
Shortening Trials, 65 F.R.D. 485 (1974) ("There are many good ways to manage a calendar,
control discovery and pretrial, and reduce trial time. Every good way requires the judge to
be in control-he must closely supervise the cases from the time they are filed."); Frankel,
supra note 7, at 522-24.
92. See, e.g., Flanders, supra note 14, at 156 ("an important part of the developing
ideology for case management has been comprehensive use of the pretrial order and the
pretrial conference to refine issues and define the direction of the case"); Lambros, supra
note 82; Oleck, supra note 88, at 72; Solomon, supra note 91, passim.
93. See FED. R. EvD.614(b) ("The Court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by
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witnesses.9 4 There has even been some increase in the practice of
judicial summary of and comment upon the evidence presented by
the litigants. e5 All of this has appreciably altered the dynamics of
the adversary process by encouraging judicial management at the
expense of party control of proceedings."8 The justification for
these alterations has been that there is a need to conserve judicial
time and increase courtroom efficiency.97 Seldom has so much as a
sidelong glance been devoted to the clash of the managerial concept with the adversary ideal of a passive and neutral
decisionmaker.
The critics of the adversary process have coupled their efforts
to expand the authority of the judiciary with attacks upon the
competence of lawyers. It has been repeatedly asserted that a
large, perhaps overwhelming, segment of the trial bar is incompetent. 8 The advocates of change also contend that attorney incomitself or by a party."); The Unnecessarily Expanding Role, supra note 7, at 52-61, n.253
(commenting on the behavior of Judge Sirica in the Watergate case).
94. See FED. R. Evm. 706 (court appointed experts); FED. R. EviD. 614(a) (calling witness by court); Kunert, supra note 44, at 163; The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role, supra
note 7, at 65-80.
95. See The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role, supra note 7, at 22-52; see also Lakeside
v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978) (affirming power of trial judge to give cautionary instruction
to jury concerning defendant's silence despite defendant's objection):
In an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right more essential
than the right to the assistance of counsel. But that right has never been understood to confer upon defense counsel the power to veto the wholly permissible
actions of the trial judge. It is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial. "'[T]he judge is not a mere
moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper
conduct and of determining questions of law.' Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S.
466, 469 (1933)." Geders v. United States, 426 U.S. 80, 86 (1975).
Id. at 341-42.
96. See PROCEDURAL JUSTIcE, supra note 7, at 123-24; Cappelletti, supra note 66, at
879-81.
97. See generally note 92 supra; The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role, supra note 7, at
7-8 ("in an era of burgeoning caseloads, complex litigation, and overworked judges, it is
readily apparent why some judges believe they must intervene at trial to maintain a reasonable pace and protect their dockets from unnecessary overcrowding").
98. See, e.g., Burger, A Sick Profession, 27 FED. B.J. 228 (1967) (75-90% of lawyers
inadequate in the courtroom); Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized
Training and Certificationof Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM
L. REv. 227, 236 (1973) (many lawyers are unable to examine, cross-examine, handle exhibits, develop the facts, or "observe the rules of professional manners and professional etiquette that are essential for effective trial advocacy.") [hereinafter cited as Special Skills];
Devitt, Improving Federal Trial Advocacy, 16 JUDGES' J., 40, 40-41 (Spring 1977) (citing the
remarks of Justice Burger, Judge Bazelon and Judge Kaufman); Kaufman, The Court

19801

DECLINING ADVERSARY SYSTEM

petence is a major cause of inefficiency and delay.99 This criticism
has helped to undermine the confidence of both laymen and lawyers in trial attorneys. 10 0 It has contributed to a decline in the au-

thority and importance of the trial bar and has facilitated the
growth of judicial power in the management of the trial process. 10 1
Along with the increase in judicial power and the decline of
the trial bar has come an attack on the jury system. For at least
seventy-five years the advocates of change in the adversary system
have criticized the use of juries as decisionmakers. °2 Detractors
have claimed that a judge can perform the decisionmaking function far more effectively than can a jury,10 3 that juries decide in
arbitrary and capricious ways, 1°4 and that juries are grossly incom-

petent to deal with complex issues. 105 However, the most frequently voiced criticism of the jury has been that it wastes valua-

ble judicial time and resources. 10 6 Suggested solutions to the
Needs a Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175, 176 (1974) (the bar suffers because many of its
members demonstrate a "lack of experience, lack of competence, and lack of integrity");
The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role, supra note 7, at 4-7, n.11.
99. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 8, at 33-34; Special Skills, supra note 98, at 234-35;
The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role, supra note 7, at 7-8.
100. For evidence of the trial lawyer's declining prestige see PROCEEDINGS, supra note
58, at 102 (remarks of Paul Dewitt); THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE, supra note 9, at 142-43
(quoting the remarks of Judge J. Edward Lumbard); The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role,
supra note 7, at 4-7.
101. See Lay, What Not to Learn from the British System-Demythologizing the
Problem of Effective Advocacy, 16 JUDGEs' J. (Summer 1977) passim; The Unnecessarily
Expanding Role, supra note 7, at 7-9.
102. See, e.g., Lummus, Civil Juries and the Law's Delay, 12 B.U. L. REv. 487 (1932);
Sebille, Trial By Jury: An Ineffective Survival, 10 A.B.A.J. 53 (1924); Sunderland, The
Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1915).
103. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 7, at 126-27; Redish, supra note 28, at 504-05 (there
is significant question concerning the "ability of twelve laymen to make accurate factual
findings in a legal case").
104. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 7, at 114-15; Redish, supra note 28, at 502-03;
Sebille, supra note 102, at 55 ("Too long has ignorance been permitted to sit ensconced in
the places of judicial administration where knowledge is so sorely needed. Too long has the
lament of the Shakesperian [sic] character been echoed, 'Justice has fled to brutish beasts
and men have lost their reason.' ").
105. See, e.g., Kirkahm, supra note 41, at 208-09 ("It is difficult to imagine a less appropriate mechanism for the determination of facts in a protracted and complicated suit
than the civil jury."); Redish, supra note 28, at 505; Schaefer, Is the Adversary System
Working in Optimal Fashion?,70 F.R.D. 159, 162 (1976).
106. See, e.g., Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, in JUSTICE ON TRIAL,
supra note 76, at 116-20; Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1971, 57 A.B.A.J.
855, 858 (1971); Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should be Abolished, 60 A.B.A.J. 570, 571
(1974) ("the cause of delay is the jury system" citing remarks of David Peck); McDonald,
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problems caused by jury trial have included alteration of the jury
selection process, 10 7 reduction of the size of juries,108 diminution of
the number of affirmative votes needed to support a verdict,109 and
outright abolition of the jury system.110
The question of whether the right to have a jury trial has been
curtailed is a complex one. To some degree, the right has been insulated from dramatic alteration because of its incorporation in the
Constitution 11 and endorsement in a significant number of Supreme Court decisions. 112 This legal foundation has insured the

availability of some sort of jury in most cases. There is even evisupra note 71, at 71 (citimg remark of then United States Court of Appeals Judge Warren
Burger "if we could eliminate the jury we would have a lot of time"); Redish, supra note 28,
at 506-07; Schaefer, supra note 105, at 161 ("One of these major defects is the extent to
which trial by jury delays the disposition of cases.").
The accuracy of this criticism is open to question. See DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note
1, at 4; C. JomR, supra note 21, at 71-72 ("When a case is tried before a judge, it does not
proceed with the same dispatch as if it were tried before a jury.").
107. See, e.g., Miller, The National Conference on the Judiciaryand Its Consensus, 55
JUDICATURE 61, 63 (1971) (the consensus of the National Conference on the Judiciary recommended judges conduct the voir dire process to prevent "undue delay"); Oleck, supra note
88, at 71; Reform on Their Minds, supra note 26, at 190.
108. See, e.g., Bogue & Fritz, The Six-Man Jury, 17 S.D. L. REv. 285, 285 (1972); Burger Interview, supra note 65, at 40 (smaller juries "would help in management, time and
cost"); Reform on Their Minds, supra note 26, at 192 ("Approximately 40 percent of the
judges [surveyed with a questionnaire designed by Professor Maurice Rosenberg] favor
smaller juries, preferably of six members ....
The attitude was that a smaller jury would
simple [sic] contribute to time and cost efficiency.").
109. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 97; Reform on Their Minds, supra note
26, at 193.
110. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 21, at 89; Devitt, supra note 106, passim; Landis,
supra note 106, at 120; Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 818-19; Schaefer, supra note 105, at
165 ("The jury is an accustomed form, but the time is ripe to consider whether that form,
valuable as it may be in criminal cases, has not outlived its usefulness in the world in which
we live today.").
111. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
112. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (Seventh Amendment
entitles either party to demand jury trial in action to recover possession of real property in
District of Columbia); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (Seventh Amendment entitles
either party to demand a jury trial in damage actions brought in federal court pursuant to
§ 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Fourteenth Amendment makes Sixth Amendments requirement of jury trial in "serious" criminal cases applicable to the States); Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial preserved in cases where both equitable and legal issues are
raised); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial preserved in cases where both equitable and legal issues are raised); Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (despite contrary state rule jury should decide factual
issue in diversity action).
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dence in some decisions of fairly recent vintage that the Court has
continued to gradually expand the availability of juries."'
While the right to jury trial may not, in itself, have been significantly curtailed, procedures for its implementation have undergone a radical transformation. At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court held that a jury was required by law to be comprised
of twelve jurors." 4 Almost simultaneously, the Court indicated
that juries were expected to render unanimous verdicts.11 5 It was
also expected that juries would be impaneled only after opposing
counsel had an opportunity to conduct a fairly extensive voir dire
to ferret out biased jurors,""8 and after counsel had been permitted
to exercise peremptory challenges to remove those veniremen who
might harbor less than manifest prejudices. 117 All of these procedures have come under judicial review and have been either substantially narrowed or abandoned.
In Williams v. Florida"8 and Colgrove v. Battin,"9 the Su113. See cases cited in note 112 supra; Redish, supra note 28, at 494-95 n.33. However,
there are a number of recent indications that the expansion of the jury trial right has come
to a halt. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (Seventh Amendment
not violated by offensive use of collateral estoppel to prohibit relitigation of finding made in
prior equitable action); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no trial by jury
required in state juvenile delinquency proceeding); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10
(1970) (in determining the applicability of the Seventh Amendment courts may consider
"the practical abilities and limitation of juries"); see also Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in
Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARv. L. REv. 898 (1979).
114. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899) (trial by jury within the
meaning of the Seventh Amendment requires a panel of twelve); Thompson v. Utah, 170
U.S. 343, 349 (1898) ("[t]he jury referred to in the original Constitution and in the Sixth
Amendment is a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more
nor less.") (citations omitted); see also Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REv. 669, 672-73 (1918).
115. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1948); Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 288-90 (1930); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 211-12 (1903); Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 355 (1898); see also Scott, supra
note 114, at 673-74.
116. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965) ("The voir dire in American
trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories, and the process of selecting a jury protracted."); Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick,
Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL.L. REV. 916, 922 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Expediting Voir Dire].
117. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-17, 219-20 (1965); Pointer v. United
States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887); see also Note,
Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory
Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1493, 1502-03 n.37 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Minimum
Standards].
118. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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preme Court overturned its prior decisions concerning twelve person juries. In each case the Court approved the use of as few as six
jurors. It appeared to base its holding on two propositions: first,
that the requirement of a jury of twelve was a "historical accident,"' 12 0 and second, that six could function as well as twelve in
carrying out the tasks assigned the jury.12 1 To support the latter
conclusion, the Court cited and appeared to rely upon a number of
articles dealing with the deliberations of six member juries or other
small groups. 2' In Johnson v. Louisiana1 23 and Apodaca v. Ore-

gon,124 the Court held that a unanimous jury verdict was not required in state court criminal trials. In so holding a majority of the
members of the Court appeared to rely upon the two-pronged

analysis previously set forth in Williams.2 5
On their face, these four decisions do not appear to have been
motivated by a desire to promote speed or efficiency. Only in the
Johnson case is there any specific reference to or reliance upon a
119.

413 U.S. 149 (1973).

120. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 89; see also, And Then There Were None, supra
note 25, at 712.
121. The Court took a narrow view of the function of the jury. In the criminal context
it defined that function as the prevention of "oppression by the Government." Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. at 100. As the Court continued:
[g]iven this purpose, the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a
group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility
that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence. The performance of this role is not a function of the particular number of the body that
makes up the jury.
Id.
In the civil context the Court said the function of the jury was "to assure a fair and
equitable resolution of factual issues." Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. at 157. It saw no significant distinction between six and twelve member panels in discharging this function. Id. at
157-58.
Remarkable in this analysis is the absence of any careful consideration of the function of
the jury in achieving the adversary system goal of decisionmaking neutrality.
122. See studies cited in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 101 nn.48 & 49; Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. at 159-60 n.15; Lempert, supra note 25, at 644; And Then There Were
None, supra note 25, at 713-15; Zeisel & Diamond, Convincing EmpiricalEvidence on the
Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. Rav. 281, 281-82 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Convincing
Empirical Evidence].
123. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
124. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
125. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 406-11. ("After considering the history of the 12man requirement and the functions it performs in contemporary society, we concluded that
it was not of constitutional stature. We reach the same conclusion today with regard to the
requirement of unanimity.") Id. at 406.
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state interest to "facilitate, expedite, and reduce expense in the
administration of criminal justice." 12 6 However, on closer examination it becomes clear that the arguments advanced to justify Williams and its progeny are insufficient. The notion of efficiency appears to be the only basis upon which the decisions may be
defended.
In Ballew v. Georgia,27 various members of the Court admitted that the decisions were based on efficiency. There all the Justices agreed that a jury of five was too small to perform the jury
function effectively. Justice Blackmun gave several reasons why
five jurors were not enough. Among the reasons were that "progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group deliberation,' 25 that there are "doubts about the accuracy of the results achieved by smaller and smaller panels,"' 2 9 that "the verdicts
of jury deliberation in ciminal cases will vary as juries become
smaller, and that the variance amounts to an imbalance to the detriment of one side, the defense," 30 and that "reduction in size will
erect additional barriers to [minority group] representation."''
It
is clear that these propositions apply with almost equal force to
six-member juries. 3 2 Additionally, it is clear, both from Ballew
and the critical literature, that the empirical studies upon which
Williams was premised are open to serious question. 3 3 Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Ballew suggests only one alternative rationale, "[s]avings in court time and in financial costs."' 3 ' From all
the available evidence this appears to be the only enduring explanation for the changes adopted in Williams and subsequent cases.
The changes made with respect to jury size and unanimous
verdicts have effectively reduced the reliability3 5 and neutrality of
126. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 364, quoting State v. Lewis, 129 La. 800, 804, 56
So. 893, 894 (1911).
127. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
128. Id. at 232.
129. Id. at 234.
130. Id. at 236.
131. Id. at 237.
132. Id. at 239 ("We readily admit that we do not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and five."); Zeisel, Twelve Is Just, TRUL, 12 (Nov.fDec. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Twelve Is Just].
133. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 231-39 nn.10-32, 242-43 nn.34-37.
134. Id. at 243-44.
135. See id. at 232-35; Lempert, supra note 25, at 685-89; Convincing Empirical Evidence, supra note 122, at 294; Twelve Is Just, supra note 132, at 15.
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juries. 136 These decisions have thus reduced the utility of jury
trials in achieving the adversary system's goals of decisionmaker
neutrality and passivity. They have also made the jury a far less
predictable and attractive option to litigants, thereby effectively
curtailing the right to jury trial.18 7 This change was accomplished
without meaningful discussion of its impact upon the adversary
system or consideration of the values vindicated by either the unanimity or twelve juror requirement.138
The scope of voir dire in criminal cases was addressed by the
Supreme Court in Ham v. South Carolina.13 9 The Court held that
while inquiry into matters of racial bias might be constitutionally
required if a state had established a voir dire procedure, examination concerning other sources of bias could, in a trial court's discretion, be omitted.1 40 As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in
Ham, this holding vests trial judges with the power to undermine
the selection of an impartial jury by "totally foreclosing

sonable
prejudice.

and relevant
14 1

avenues

of inquiry

as

to

. . .

rea-

possible

In Ristaino v. Ross,1 42 the Court went a step beyond

Ham and held that there was no category of juror prejudice (including racial bias) that would, independent of the specifics of a
given case, mandate inquiry on voir dire. The Court rejected the
contention that Ham had required inquiry into questions of juror
racial prejudice separate and apart from the circumstances of
136. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 233 ("the smaller the group, the less likely it is
to overcome the biases of its members"); Lempert, supra note 25, at 687.
137. See And Then There Were None, supra note 25:
Whatever the extent of the "gamble" incurred through the twelve-member jury,
we must expect that it will be significantly greater with a six-member jury. This
-increase in the "gamble" might well have an interesting side effect; it could increase the incidence of jury waiver and thereby reduce the frequency of jury
trials.
Id. at 718-19 (footnote omitted).
138. The only consideration of this question came in Justice Douglas' dissent in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 394 ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimity of criminal verdicts and the presumption of innocence are basic features of the accusatorial system.
What we do today is not in that tradition but more in the tradition of the inquisition.").
139. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
140. Id. at 527-28. See Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors:ConstitutionalLimits to the Right of
Inquiry into Prejudice, 48 U. COLO. L. Rsv. 525, 537 (1977); Minimum Standards, supra
note 117, at 1511.
141. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. at 531; Minimum Standards,supra note 117, at
1510, n.77.
142. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
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Ham's trial. 143 In Ross, the Court approved, in effect, the impanelment of potentially biased jurors except when the facts of the case
"were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of
the jury might harbor.

'144

Ham and Ross not only expanded tolerance of juror prejudice,
they also approved a method for the administration of voir dire
that cedes wide ranging powers to the trial judge while shrinking to
insignificance the role of trial counsel in the inquiry process. Except in unusual circumstances, the trial judge is free to pick and
choose the topics to be covered and the questions to be asked. The
method approved in Ham and Ross also serves to undermine the
value of peremptory challenges. It is unlikely that the judge dominated voir dire will be used to explore the latent biases of veniremen.14 5 This curtailment of peremptories is consonant with other
in an effort to reduce the
action initiated by the Supreme Court
14
scope of the peremptory challenge.

6

Neither Ham nor Ross sets forth any clear reason for the
Court's endorsement of a judge centered, narrowly circumscribed
voir dire procedure. However, it is reasonably clear that the Court
hoped by its action to effect savings in judicial time and public
4
funds. A number of commentators have reached this conclusion1 7
and at least one member of the Court advanced such a rationale in
public comment concerning voir dire.1 48 What has not been can143. Id. at 595-96. See Gaba, supra note 140, at 539-41.
144. 424 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added). See Gaba, supra note 140, at 540-42 ("by focusing on the issues of the trial, rather than the possible bias of venirepeople, the court virtually gave constitutional sanction to the presence of biased individuals on a jury").
145. See Babcock, Voir Dire:Preserving 'Its Wonderful Power,' 27 STAN. L. REv. 545,
548-49 (1975).
146. See the proposed rule and Advisory Committee Note concerning the amendment
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b). H.R. Doc. No. 464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15
(1976) (recommending the reduction of the number of peremptory challenges available to
criminal defendants). But see S. RE'. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 532-33 (rejecting the proposed amendment).
147. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. at 534 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I cannot
believe that in these circumstances an absolute ban on questions designed to uncover such
prejudice represents a proper balance between the competing demands of fairness and expedition."); Gaba, supra note 140, at 532; Minimum Standards,supra note 117. See also Expediting Voir Dire,supra note 116, at 923 n.28 (identifying a number of trials held between
1967 and 1971 in which voir dire was lengthy and a cause of judicial concern).
148. See Babcock, supranote 145, at 545 n.3 (citing the address of Chief Justice Burger
to the National Conference on the Judiciary on March 12, 1971); Burger, supra note 21, at
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vassed in the Court's opinions is the impact of diminished voir dire
on the adversary process. It seems fairly evident that reduction of
voir dire and coordinate discounting of the value of peremptory
challenges diminish the likelihood that a neutral and unbiased jury
will be selected. 149 The reduction of voir dire thereby undermines a
central goal of the adversary system.
The procedural and evidentiary rules governing the adversary
process have also been the targets of reformers seeking to speed
judicial operations. Critics have suggested that the detailed rules
governing the judicial process are dilatory and should be substantially curtailed in favor of more efficient procedures relying extensively on the exercise of trial court discretion. 1 50 Those responsible

for the redrafting of procedural codes have, to a certain extent,
adopted a similar attitude.' 5 '
While all changes in the rules governing judicial proceedings
have not sought speed at the expense of adversary principles, quite
149. See Gaba, supra note 140, at 527 & n.12.
150. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 8,at 86-90 (the various rules of procedure have in
many instances multiplied the "decision points costly in both time and dollars"); Pound,
supra note 2, at 284 (court procedure has caused "[u]ncertainty, delay and expense, and
above all, the injustice of deciding cases upon points of practice, which are the mere etiquette of justice. . ."); Scott, Pound'sInfluence on Civil Procedure,78 HARV. L. REV. 1568,
1671 (1965) (Pound strongly advocated judicial discretion in the vindication of procedure
"intended solely to assure the orderly dispatch of business.").
151. A desire to speed the functioning of the courts played a significant role in the
process leading to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Cummings, Modernizing FederalProcedure,24 A.B.A.J. 625, 626 (1938). See also FED. R. Civ. P.
1 (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action"). Similar desires were at work in states which
adopted rules akin to those set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,
Covington & Reese, Court Delay-Texas Style, 4 Hous. L. REv. 92, 95 & n.13 (1966).
The expanding role of discretion in the rules of procedure has been delineated by Professor Rosenberg in Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173
(1978):
I once searched the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from start to finish to
discover how many times the word "discretion" occurs. It turned up only ten
times. Yet if one reads the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals and
reviews the major treatises, one finds at least forty procedural situations in
which the courts of appeals have construed a rule to grant discretion to the district court. The decisions have recognized discretion in the ten rules in which it
explicitly appears and additionally in at least three times as many rules in which
there is no reference to the word. That would lead to you to think that it is not
important whether discretion is expressly written into the rule or not. Rather, it
depends on whether the appellate courts think it should have been there.
Id. at 174.
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often in recent years amendments to the rules of procedure and
evidence have overlooked adversary concerns or expanded the discretion of trial judges at the expense of the adversaries. Outstanding examples of these tendencies may be found in the recently
adopted Federal Rules of Evidence. In these rules the trial judge
has been given discretion with respect to a wide variety of matters,
including the manner to proceed in determining a preliminary
question of fact, 15 2 the applicability of the hearsay rule, 53 and the
permissibility of using various techniques of cross-examination."
FED. R. Evm. 104(a):
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect
to privileges.
See Kaplan, supra note 21, at 1010.
153. FED. R. Evm. 803(24):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

152.

(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence
of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant.
See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5); Martin, Inherent JudicialPower: Flexibility Congress Did Not
Write into the FederalRules of Evidence, 57 TExAs L. REv. 167, 169 (1979). But see S. REP.
No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 18-20, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051,
7065-66.
154. FED. R. Evm. 611:
(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of cross-examination.Cross-examination should be limited to the
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of
the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination.
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony.
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The revision of the rules has also reduced the likelihood that categories of evidence previously adjudged unreliable or prejudicial will
be excluded. Limitations on the exclusion worked by the hearsay
rule well illustrate this point.15 Change has been made without extensive consideration of its impact on the adversary process.
Finally, the advocates of a speedy judicial process have focused critical attention on the courts of appeal. They have argued
that the sort of review envisioned as a part of the adversary process is costly and inefficient. 56 Critical attacks have been sharpest
in the criminal context, where a defendant's persistent utilization
of appellate procedures has been branded "warfare with society."1 57 The critics have suggested that a variety of measures be
taken to curtail the availability of appeals.
The Supreme Court has never held that there is an absolute
Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a
party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an
adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions.
See Martin, supra note 153, at 169 n.8.
155. In addition to the open-ended hearsay exceptions of FED. R. EviD. 803(24) and
804(b)(5) the Federal Rules of Evidence have authorized the use of hearsay in a variety of
contexts. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 104(a) (hearsay may be used by the judge in adjudicating
preliminary questions of admissibility of evidence); FED. R. EvD. 70a (expert may rely on
hearsay in formulating his opinions). Further, certain out-of-court actions which were traditionally considered hearsay are defined as nonhearsay under the Federal Rules. Compare
Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. 1837) (out-of-court action treated as equivalent
of hearsay whether or not action was intended as an assertion) with FED. R.EvID. 801(a) &
(c) (out-of-court action not hearsay unless "intended ... as an assertion").
156. See, e.g., M. FLEMING, supra note 67, at 44-53 (multiple appeals and review as a
cause of almost "interminable" delay); Burger Interview, supra note 65, at 35 ("I suppose,
when you talk about finality, that must carry with it a limit somewhere-that there is a
point at which proceedings of all kinds are terminated. We haven't found that point in our
system."); Pound, supra note 2, at 287-88; Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1366.
157. See Burger, For Whom The Bell Tolls, in 36 VrrITA SPEECHES OF THE DAY 322
(1970):
In some of these multiple trial and appeal cases the accused continued his warfare with society for 8, 9, 10 years and more. In one case more than 60 jurors and
alternates were involved in 5 trials, a dozen trial judges heard an array of motions and presided over these trials; more than 30 different lawyers participated
either as court-appointed counsel or prosecutors and in all more than 50 appellate judges reviewed the case on appeals. I tried to calculate the costs for that
one criminal case and the ultimate conviction. The best estimates could not be
very accurate, but it added up to a quarterof a million dollars. The tragic aspect was the waste and futility since every lawyer, every judge and every juror
was fully convinced of the defendant's guilt from the beginning to the end.
Id. (emphasis in the original). See also M. FLEMING, supra note 67, at 52.
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right to appeal decisions, even in criminal cases.1 58 However, it is
generally agreed that a person convicted of a crime will be provided one appeal as of right.15 9 The Supreme Court helped assure
this result by guaranteeing indigent defendants appointed counsel
to press their first appeal, 16 0 by requiring that indigents be provided transcripts if a written record is necessary for appeal, 6 1 and
by requiring the waiver of fees that would otherwise bar the filing
of an appeal.1 2 These decisions are now so firmly rooted it is unlikely that appellate review in criminal matters will be directly curtailed. In contrast, the Court has recently endorsed rules that limit
access to appeal in civil cases, reduce the scope of appeal in all
cases, and diminish the availability of review beyond the first appeal as of right.
In Ortwein v. Schwab, 63 the Supreme Court approved significant procedural limitations on the right to appeal in civil cases.
The State of Oregon required the payment of a $25 filing fee
before any civil appeal could be initiated. Ortwein, an indigent recipient of public assistance, sought waiver of the fee in order to
obtain review of an administrative hearing determination that had
authorized the reduction of his public assistance. His request for
waiver of the filing fee was denied by the Oregon courts. The
United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, rejected
Ortwein's claim that he should have been permitted to perfect his
appeal without paying a fee. As the basis for its ruling the Court
stated that "due process does not require a State to provide an
appellate system."'" The implication of this holding is that within
certain limits,16 5 the State is free, at least in civil cases, to curtail
158. See, e.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) (state is not required to provide
any appellate process even in criminal cases).
159. The cases virtually assuring appellate review of criminal convictions are set forth
in notes 160-62 infra. It is widely agreed that appeals are similarly available in the civil
context. See, e.g., Fuld, The Gordian Knot: Congestion and Delay in Our Courts, 39 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 488, 490 (1967); Hufstedler, ConstitutionalRevision and Appellate Court Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. REv. 577, 590 (1969) ("the prevailing philosophy [is] that every litigant should have one appeal as a matter of right").
160. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
161. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
162. See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
163. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
164. Id. at 660.
165. See 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) ("When an appeal is afforded ... it cannot be granted
to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal
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significantly the availability of appeals.
The scope of review on appeal in both criminal and civil cases
has been progressively narrowed over the last seventy years. At
about the turn of the century the standard for review of procedural
and other errors at trial was quite strict, mandating reversal virtually whenever error was found. 166 Experience demonstrated that
this strict standard was impractical because it resulted in reversals
for plainly frivolous reasons. 16 7 To overcome this problem, the doctrine of harmless error was fashioned. This doctrine required the
appellant to show that not only the rules regulating the adversary
contest had been breached, but also that the breach had caused
him an injury affecting his "substantial rights."1 68 The harmless
error rule has been steadily expanded by the Supreme Court with
the net effect of drastically reducing procedurally premised reversals.169 The rule has also been extended by judicial interpretation
so that it encompasses issues other than procedure. Now, even a
wide variety of constitutional errors may be treated as harmless.1 70
The growth of the doctrine of harmless error has reduced the likelihood of success on appeal and undermined adversarial reliance on
the appellate process as a means of assuring compliance with the
Protection Clause.").
166. See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 54, at 3-4 ("There was a time in the law, extending
into our own century, when no error was lightly forgiven."); The Harm of Harmless Error,
supra note 42, at 999-1005, n.46; Mause, Harmless ConstitutionalError: The Implications
of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. Rxv. 519, 519 (1969) ("Under common law, prior to
the enactment of the harmless error statutes, any error, regardless of its significance, resulted in an automatic reversal of the trial court's decision.") Pound, supra note 2, at 282.
167. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759-60 (1946); R. TRAYNOR, supra
note 54, at 13; The Harm of Harmless Error,supra note 42, at 1005; Mause, supra note 166,
at 519.
168. For a brief history of the federal harmless error rule see Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. at 758-60. See also R. TRAYNOR, supra note 54, at 14; The Harm of Harmless Error,supra note 42, at 1005-07, 1006 nn.57 & 58. The federal rule presently appears at
29 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976) ("On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the
court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."). This statute is supplemented by procedural rules applicable in civil and criminal cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 61;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
169. See The Harm of Harmless Error,supra note 42, at 1010 ("the federal statute has
eliminated any tendency on the part of the federal appellate courts to reverse convictions
because of technical errors").
170. See The Harm of Harmless Error,supra note 42, at 1012-18. For examples of the
operation of the harmless error doctrine in the constitutional context, see, e.g., Milton v.
Wainright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Harrington v. Callfornia, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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rules of procedure and evidence in the trial courts." 1
In the case of Ross v. Moffitt,17 2 the Supreme Court deter-

mined that indigent criminal defendants did not have a right to
the appointment of counsel for the purpose of pursuing appeals
beyond the first appeal as of right. The Court began its analysis by
reciting the proposition that no appeal whatsoever was required by
law to be provided to a losing party in either a civil or criminal
case. 73 It next analyzed the function of court appointed attorneys
on appeals in criminal cases and described them "as a sword to
upset the prior determination of guilt. ' 174 While such a "sword"

might be required to be equally available to all criminal defendants on a first appeal as of right, the Supreme Court concluded
that beyond the first step, appeals did not have to be encouraged
or their availability be made equal. In essence, the availability of
discretionary appeals was held to be totally within the control of
the legislatures and appellate courts, to be narrowed or prohibited
as those bodies saw fit. While the holding in Ross v. Moffitt does
no more than deny counsel to indigent defendants in discretionary
appeals, its rationale seems to signal a retreat from the fundamental adversary concept of appellate review.
In all three of the areas in which appellate review has been
curtailed, precious little discussion has been undertaken of the
function of appeals in an adversary system. While the rhetoric of
swift and certain justice did not figure largely in the decisions announced, the absence of other justification for the choices made
would suggest once again the influence of arguments concerning
speed and efficiency.175
171. See The Harm of Harmless Error,supra note 42:
The impact of the error upon the defendant's case may be amplified by the
fact that because the error may be held harmless few lawyers will themselves
attempt to depend or advise clients to depend on the appellate court's setting
the record straight. It is much more likely that trial strategy will change to accommodate rulings of the trial court, however erroneous.
Id. at 990; Mause, supra note 166, at 519-20.
172. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
173. Id. at 606.
174. Id. at 611.
175. The primary motivation for any harmless error rule is the saving of time and judicial effort. See R. TRAyNoR, supra note 54, at 14 ("Their objective is to conserve not merely
public funds, but the judicial process itself for legitimate disputes by guarding against needless reversals and new trials that would clog already burdened trial-court calendars.");
Mause, supra note 166, at 543 ("judicial economy [is] the only real justification for a harm-
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IV. THE NEED TO CONSIDER

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RHETORIC
OF SwIFT AND CERTAIN JUSTICE

Critics have treated delay as a serious threat to the viability of
the judicial process. Their earnestly advanced argument is that the
courts, as presently constituted, are overtaxed and cannot continue
to function in our society unless they are provided some sort of
relief. It is argued that the only way to provide the requisite relief
is to limit the time it takes to decide cases and limit the number of
cases to be decided. Those aspects of the adversary process which
cause delay are classified as expensive luxuries that cannot be afforded in a system fighting for its life.
The vigor with which these arguments have been pressed and
their apparent influence suggest that the rhetoric of swift and certain justice poses a serious threat of undermining the adversary
process as a whole. Almost every procedure in the adversary process moves at a measured pace rather than at maximum speed. Delay, or perhaps more accurately, deliberation, has been built into
every aspect of the adversary system. If one adopts the view that
delay is a danger so serious that virtually all other concerns bow
before it, then each and every part of the adversary process is open
to successful challenge.
Few commentators and judges who have utilized Pound's rhetoric or otherwise argued for an acceleration of the pace of judicial
business have been willing to recognize that, implicitly, their criticisms damn the whole adversary framework. Delay is simply
presented as an evil to be eradicated wherever found and however
caused. No attention is devoted to the implications of the speedy
justice argument or the consequence of undermining significant
components of the adversary process. Nor have the critics of the
adversary system chosen to defend the fast-moving, judge dominated, nonadversarial alternative they appear to advocate.
In case after case, the United States Supreme Court has subless error rule"); Note, Harmless ConstitutionalError, 20 STAN. L. Rav. 83, 83-84 (1967);
Note, Individualized Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Study of Dispositional
Decision Making," 81 HARv. L. REv. 1260, 1270 (1968).
The textual proposition is reinforced when it is noted that in Ross v. Moffitt, the states
of North Carolina, Florida, Illinois, and Virginia, all based their argument against the extension of the right to counsel on the claim that the costs involved would be excessive. See
Note, Cost and Judicial Management Considerations in the Right to Counsel for Indigents' DiscretionaryAppeals-Ross v. Moffitt, 24 DE PAUL L. R.v. 813, 824 n.64 (1975).
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stantially curtailed adversary procedure without pausing to consider the impact of change on the justice system.17 This is readily
apparent in the decisions concerning plea bargaining, jury operation, and appellate procedure. Not one of the seminal opinions in
these areas focuses on the value of the adversary process or the
propriety of abandoning some aspect of it. Rather than engage in
careful analysis, the Court has chosen to rely on the rhetoric of
swift and certain justice, 17 7 dubious scientific studies, 17 8 or simplistic notions about the operation of mechanisms incorporated in the
17 9
justice system.
The quality of scholarly literature urging acceleration of the
judicial process has not been much better. Roscoe Pound coined
ringing phrases which have endured for seventy-five years. However, Dean Pound relied more on rhetoric than analysis in rejecting
adversary process. 180 Similar shortcomings are manifest in the public statements of Chief Justice Burger. The Chief Justice's sharp
attacks on delay and the procedures that allegedly cause it are
never balanced with an analysis of the advantages of the present
system or a discussion of the merits of a nonadversarial alternative. The sharpest criticisms of delay and the adversary system
have been advanced by critics who ignore value questions fundamental to any serious consideration of change in the legal process.
Such consideration is obviously essential in order to come to a
176. The Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in promoting the cause of
swift adjudication. Its treatment of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial demonstrates a curious reluctance to secure celerity in the criminal process. See United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27
STAN. L. REv. 525, 538-39 (1975) ("The amendment has ... been twisted totally out of
shape-distorted from a guarantee that all accuseds will receive a speedy trial into a windfall benefit of criminal immunity for a very few accuseds in whose cases the pandemic failure of our courts to provide speedy trials has attained peculiarly outrageous proportions.");
Rudstein, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v. Wingo in the Lower Courts, 1975 U. ILL.
L. REv. 11, 58; Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Past Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 1376, 1399-1400 (1972).
177.

See notes 77-79 supra.

-

.

178. See note 122 supra.
179. See notes 121 & 174 supra.
180. For a criticism of the empirical underpinnings of Pound's 1906 speech, see Kalven,
The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 56-74 (G. Hazard ed. 1968) ("The speech is thus a monument to a certain legal
attitude. It has an aura of empiricism but displays literally no interest in finding out
whether its topic as defined has any reality, or whether its diagnosis has any validity."). Id.
at 60-61.
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reasoned 181
decision about how the justice system should be
organized.
No one can seriously object to the introduction of efficient
techniques of judicial administration when those techniques do not
reduce reliance on adversary methodology. 182 Even when reliance
on adversary process is reduced, the result may be entirely acceptable if fundamental questions of values are considered and resolved. In Hickman v. Taylor,183 the Supreme Court addressed the
scope of the federal rules of discovery. Critics of these rules
claimed, with some justification, that they could serve to discourage litigants from diligently preparing their cases for trial, and
hence, seriously undermine the adversary system.18 ' In its opinion,
the Court carefully considered both the requirements of an adversary system 8 5 and the value of discovery as a modification of that
system. 188 The Court then sought to fashion a compromise that
would secure the benefits of discovery, while minimizing the threat
discovery posed to the adversary process. Accordingly, the Court
181. See DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 1, at 207; Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and ProposedRemedies, in Tim COURTS, Tim PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION
(H. Jones ed. 1965):
Offsetting its paradoxical benefits for the administration of justice, the counterattack on trial delay has involved heavy costs-more than merely in money
and effort. A serious debit has been the loss of a sense of proportion by many
well-intentioned custodians of civil justice. Many of their cures for delay are
much worse than the disease itself.
In sum, among the costs of the obsession with speedier justice has been an
erosion of the integrity of the judicial process from the viewpoint of the litigants
and lawyers, some of whom have the impression that the courts regard their
cases as merely counters in a numbers game. Slow justice is bad, but speedy
injustice is not an admissible substitute....
Id. at 57-58; Greene, supra note 76, at 248; Redish, supra note 28, at 508-09 n.92. See also
Summers, Evaluating and ImprovingLegal Processes-APlea for 'ProcessValues', 60 ConNL L. Rav. 1, 38-44 (1974).
182. An example of such a technique is the pretrial conference as conducted in the
State of New Jersey. Such conferences focus on the preparation of the case for trial and help
to insure speedy and efficient litigation without compromising judicial neutrality or other
fundamental adversarial values. See DELAY m THE COURT, supra note 1, at 99; M. ROSENBERG, THE PRmIA, CoNFERENcE AND EFFECTIVE JusncE 67-70 (1964); PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 58, at 84-85 (remarks of then Judge William Brennan, Jr.).
183. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
184. See J. FRANK, supra note 7, at 93; PRETRIAL DISCOVERY, supra note 7, at 12.

185. I-Eckman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-13. See also PRETRIAL DIscovERY, supra note
7, at 124; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 82 (2d ed. 1970).
186. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 507.
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created a qualified privilege insulating the "work product" of an
attorney from discovery in most circumstances. ls This qualified
privilege reduced the danger that discovery could be used as means
of capitalizing on an opponent's effort or be perceived as a reason
to refrain from thoroughly preparing a case.188
The method utilized in Hickman to resolve a conflict between
adversary and nonadversary objectives contrasts sharply with that
employed in the recent Supreme Court decisions concering pleas,
juries, and appeals. None of these decisions considered adversary
values. None sought a compromise that might allow the accommodation of adversary and nonadversary concerns. Hickman demonstrates that such an approach can be successfully pursued. Because
the adversary system vindicates values of real importance to American society, it is essential that such an effort be made and reliance
on the rhetoric of swift and certain justice be eschewed.
V.

SoME ARGUMENTS IN DEFENSE OF ADVERSARY PROCESS

While it is beyond the scope of this article to present a complete defense of the adversary process, some preliminary observations may be of use in helping to assess its worth. The adversary
method provides litigants the means to control their lawsuits. l8 9
The parties play a significant part in choosing the forum, designating the proofs, and running the process. The courts, as a general
matter, pursue the questions the parties propound. Ultimately, the
whole procedure yields results tailored to the litigants' needs.
Party control of the adjudicatory process has a number of advantages. First, it tends to encourage desirable conduct on the part
of the litigants and decision maker. Empirical data suggests that
an advocate working in the adversarial context who finds his client
at a factual disadvantage will expend significant effort to improve
his client's position.29 0 This is to be contrasted with the behavior of
the advocate working in an inquisitorial setting who will seldom
undertake an extensive search for better evidence to bolster a weak
187. Id. at 510.
188. See PRETRIAL DiscovRY, supra note 7, at 124; C. WRIGHT, supra note 185; Note,
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HRv. L. REv. 940, 1028-29 (1961).
189. See PROCEDURL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 22-23; Efficient Procedure, supra note
31, at 365. It should be noted that litigant control is not as extensive in the American criminal process as it is in civil litigation. See Goldstein, supra note 73.
190. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 38-39.
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case.1 91 The adversary process appears to encourage advocates to
protect parties facing an initial disadvantage and hence improve
the overall quality of the evidence upon which adjudication will be
based.
Empirical data also suggests that adversarial emphasis on
party presentation tends to counteract decisionmaker bias more effectively than does an approach requiring the active participation
of the trier in marshaling the proof.19 2 This finding provides tangible support for the theoretical assertion that the best decision
maker is one whose sole function is adjudication.19 3 Because adversary process assigns the prosecutorial function to the parties, it
serves to increase the likelihood that the trier will be able to
devote his full attention to a neutral adjudication of the case.
A second advantage that inheres in the adversary approach is
that it tends to promote litigant and societal acceptance of the decisions rendered by the courts. Theorists maintain that when a
party is intimately involved in the adjudicatory process and feels
that he has been given a fair opportunity to air his case, he is more
likely to accept the result whether favorable or not.19 ' These same
theorists further suggest that litigant control helps to establish the
appearance of fairness, which is of crucial importance in persuading society of the legitimacy of judicial action. 9 5 There is little direct evidence concerning the extent of personal or societal acceptance of adversarial as opposed to other types of decisions. There is
evidence, however, that a majority of people will designate adversary procedure the fairest sort of procedure for the resolution of
disputes. 9 6 This finding lends support to the theory that the adversary process increases the likelihood of acceptance of decisions
rendered.
A third advantage of the adversary process is that it tends to
facilitate challenges to governmental action by aggrieved individuals. Because adversary judicial process allows litigants to define the
issue to be resolved, it provides a forum to obtain consideration of
191. Id.
192. Id. at 49-51. But see Damaska, supra note 8, at 1095-1100.
193. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 34-35.
194. See PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 68; Mobilization,supra note 13, at 576.
195. See notes 16-18 supra & accompanying text.
196. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 77-80, 94-96.
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claims against the government. 19 The opportunity for a sympa-

thetic hearing is likely to be increased because the judge and, to an
even greater extent, the jury, are likely to be beyond the control of

the government body being challenged. These propositions concerning the receptivity of adversarial courts to the claims of indi-

vidual citizens are, at least in part, borne out by historical evidence. For a number of centuries adversary courts have served as a
counterbalance to official tyranny and have worked to broaden the
scope of individual rights. 198 When adversarial process has been ig-

nored in the operation of the courts, as in the days of the Star
Chamber, there has been an erosion of human rights and an increase in governmental repression.1' 9

We live in an era of expanding government power. The urgency of social problems, including the scarcity of resources and

the exigencies of national defense, tend to lead the government to
exert pressure on the citizenry to cooperate in insuring the efficient
operation of society as a whole. This pressure poses a keen threat
to the maintenafice of individual rights.200 In these circumstances,
197. See Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979):
The judge is entitfQd to exercise power only after he has participated in a
dialogue about the meaning of the public values. It is a dialogue with very special qualities: (a) Judges are not in control of their agenda, but are compelled to
confront grievances or claims they would otherwise prefer to ignore. (b) Judges
do not have full control over whom they must listen to. They are bound by rules
requiring them to listen to a broad range of persons or spokesmen. (c) Judges are
compelled to speak back, to respond to the grievance or the claim, and to assume
individual responsibility for that response. (d) Judges must also justify their
decisions.
Id. at 13.
198. See THE PARENCWmA OF LAW, supra note 21, at 403-04 (The American lawyer
"thinks it more than a coincidence that liberty has best thrived in the part of the world
where procedure has been litigious and contentious rather than officious and inquisitorial.");
Connolly, supra note 11, at 441; Self Interest and Justice,supranote 66, at 11 ("The role of
the courts in fashioning and implementing human rights has been a momentous good, especially in recent decades."); Greene, supra note 76, at 248; Tribe, Seven PluralistFallacies:
In Defense of the Adversary Process-A Reply to Justice Rehnquist, 33 U. MImi L. REv.
43, passim (1978). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (judicial authorization of detention and relocation of citizens on the basis of ancestry); A. EHRENZWEIG,
supra note 21, at 260-61 (" 'liberty has best thrived in this part of the world' despite rather
than because of its vaufited 'litigious and contentious' procedures") (emphasis in the
original).
199. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949); Connolly, supra note 11, at 441-42;
Goodhart, supra note 8, at 769-72.
200. The idea that rights are in essence claims that conflict with the interests or objec-
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there is a need to preserve the kind of institution that will sympathetically review claims based on individual rights rather than governmental necessity or the common good. Because the adversarial
,courts are primarily committed to hearing and upholding the
claims of the individuals, they are most likely to be capable of
handling this task.
In response to these suggestions, it may be argued that an inquiring judge can as effectively protect individuals as can the neutral decision maker of the adversary system. Further, it may be
said that the inquisitor can do this more efficiently and at smaller
cost. While there is some truth to the proposition that inquisitorial
process is efficient, 20 1 it is not, by its nature, committed to the
vindiction of the rights of individuals; rather, its primary goal is
the disclosure of material truth. 0 2 The adversary process is, by
contrast, devoted in large measure, to the vindication of individual
rights. 03 It should also be noted that an inquisitorial approach
tends to depersonalize litigation by reducing the participation of
the litigants.2 0 For this reason, its efficacy in handling individualized claims can be questioned. Overall, the inquisitorial process is
not as well suited to the protection of individual rights as is its
adversarial counterpart, and therefore cannot be considered a satisfactory substitute.
VI. THE PROPRIETY OF USING NONADVERSARIAL MEANS TO
RESOLvE DIsPuTEs

The adversary method is not of equal utility in resolving all
types of disputes. From the suggestions made in the preceding section, several situations can be identified in which the adversary
process would seem particularly useful. The most outstanding of
these is litigation involving a dispute between a citizen and the
government. In such a dispute, whether it be a civil rights case, a
tives of government has been most thoughtfully explored in R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS

SinuousLY, passim (1978).
201. See Small Claims Court, supra note 9, at 597, 599.
202. See notes 19-21 supra & accompanying text; Connolly, supra note 11, at 441;
Small Claims Court, supra note 9, at 596-97.
203. See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 54, at 19; THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW, supra note 21, at
412-13; THE TRmL OF THE FuTurn, supra note 9, at 46-47; Small Claims Court, supra note
9, at 601; Connolly, supra note 11, at 441.
204. See Cappelletti, supra note 66, at 876-79.

19801

DECLINING ADVERSARY SYSTEM

529

criminal matter, or a contract action, the adversary judge and jury
serve as a vital counterbalance to the power of the state.
On the other hand, there are a number of settings in which
adversary procedure does not seem appropriate. When the parties
must continue to work or live together in intimate contact or in a
cooperative relationship, the adversary method may not be the
best means of resolving their dispute.2 0 5 Adversary procedure may
exacerbate rather than resolve tensions and may not foster the
kind of compromise essential to the restoration of harmony. For
this reason, disputes like those between labor and management, or
between family members in an intact family unit should usually be
resolved in nonadversarial proceedings.
It is also sensible to utilize nonadversarial methods when all
the parties strongly desire speed, simplicity, and economy in adjudication. 0 8 In such settings adversary process will tend to intrude
undesired deliberation and expense. The labor grievance process
provides an example of the type of case in which certain adversary
20 7
procedures are avoided for reasons of economy and celerity.
Finally, where there is no dispute, adversary machinery is not
needed. In situations like the uncontested divorce, adoption, or
name change, there is little call for the panoply of procedures built
into the adversary process.2 0 8
While it is possible to list types of cases that seem more or less
suited to adversarial adjudication, any a priori designation threatens to unfairly exclude some litigants from access to procedures
they view essential to the proper consideration of their cases. An
arbitrary ban on adversarial consideration of "repetitious" cases,2 09
or cases involving small sums of money,2 10 or cases involving some
205. See C. CURTIS, supra note 11, at 3; J. FRANK, supra note 7, at 376-77; Historical
Perspective, supra note 7, at 130 n.26; Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,70 F.R.D.
111, 120 (1976).
206. See PROCEDURAL JusTicE, supra note 7, at 117; Sander, supra note 205.
207. See J. FRANK, supra note 7, at 377; Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1360-61.
208. See PROCEDURAL JusTIcE, supra note 7, at 117; A Tale of Two Courts, supra note
66, at 270; Sander, supra note 205, at 119.
209. For an endorsement of such a ban, see Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary
and a Sense of Perspective,70 F.R.D. 212, 216 (1976). But see Hufstedler, supra note 159,

at 588-89.
210. For a comment qualifiedly supporting monetary limits, see Sander, supra note 205,
at 124-25; but see Hazard, supra note 65, at 83. ("The principal difficulty of this approach is
that the social and political significance of a legal issue may have, and often does have, no

relation at all to the monetary or other intrinsic significance of the particular case in which
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"institutional relationship' ' 11 raises serious problems of social and
political judgment as well as accusations of unequal treatment. A
better approach than categorical exclusion may be a system that
allows the parties to choose the type of process best suited to their
needs. Where all the parties make an uncoerced choice to avoid
adversarial process it seems eminently sensible to honor their decision.2 1 Use of an election mechanism may ease the burden on the
adversarial courts, while protecting the rights of those who believe
they cannot obtain redress outside the adversarial framework.
Only when the nature of the adversary process and the values
it vindicates are clearly understood and considered is it possible to
determine the extent nonadversary processes should be utilized by
American courts to resolve disputes. If these issues are ignored, intelligent change is impossible. Arguments like that concerning
swift and certain justice, which tend to obscure the fundamental
issues, must be rejected as a basis upon which to premise change.

it arises."); Hufstedler, supra note 159, at 588-89.
211. Justice Rehnquist has proposed such a limit in Rehnquist, The Adversary Society:
Keynote Address of Third Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. MIAMI L.
Ray. 1, 2 (1978); but see Tribe, supra note 198, passim.
212. See Efficient Procedure,supra note 31, at 376.

